COMMENTS
SALES OF CORPORATE CONTROL AT A
PREMIUM: AN ANALYSIS AND
SUGGESTED APPROACH
INTRODUCTION

THE VALUE of a controlling interest in a corporation has become increasingly apparent. Control signifies wealth, prestige, and the power
to dictate corporate policy.' In an established corporation the holder of
a controlling interest is likely to view the power inherent in his shareholdings as giving his aggregate shares a value above their normal,
individual market price. A buyer of such shares, moreover, will frequently be willing to pay a premium to acquire control. However, a
minority shareholder, alleging corporate injury or the breach of some
duty, may seek to recover a proportionate part of the premium received
by the seller. The resulting problem is a complex one, and the courts
have not yet evolved a satisfactory approach or arrived at a settled
2
policy.
THE

PROBLEM AND ITS EARLY JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT

A variety of cases involving sales of corporate control at a premium
have been litigated. Numerous inconsistent theories have been employed-often in the same case-resulting in precedent that is-confusing
1

The concept of corporate control is difficult to delimit.

Perhaps the best definition

is that of Berle: "1'Control' may be defined as the capacity to choose directors. As a
corollary, it carries capacity to influence the board of directors and possibly to dominate
it."

Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1958).

The

nature of control varies greatly with the individual corporation, presenting many difficult legal problems. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 69-i18 (1932) ; Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 8-z2 (1951) ; Berie, supra,
at 1213-i6i Hornstein, Corporate Control and Private Property Rules,
REV. 1, 4-11 (.943).

' For general commentary on the subject see I

92

U. PA. L.

HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND

PRACTICE § 366 (1959); Berle, supra note i i Hill, The Sale of ControllingShares, 70
HARV. L. REV. 986 (1957)5 Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1956) ; Katz, The Sale of Corporate Control, 38 CHI. BAR REC. 376 (957);
For stuLeech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725 (z956).
dent comments see 40 CORNELL L.Q. 786 (1955) 5 44 IOWA L. REV. 734 (1959) ; 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 869 (i952) 5 40 VA. L. REV. 195 (i954).

This comment does not attempt to deal with questions arising from a sale of all the
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and of questionable utility. Although some authorities have suggested
that the proper approach to the problem is to forbid the retention of
any premium by the seller, 3 under the traditional view, absent qualifying
factors, the shareholder may dispose of his stock for whatever price it
will bring.4 However, there is little direct authority upholding such
a rule. Indeed, so many modifications have developed that there is
no longer a substantial general rule. The large majority of cases have
turned on specific abuses of a transfer, resulting in many dicta reiterating
the traditional approach and an absence of any ascertainable policy.
In several cases a buyer seeking the corporate assets or a particular
corporate asset has been persuaded by the officers to buy instead their
controlling stock for the same price. Relying on the general principle
that corporate fiduciaries cannot sell a corporate asset for their own
benefit, the courts have held the seller liable for the premium, reasoning
that, in reality, a corporate asset, and not controlling stock, was sold.5
Some commentators, who would deny the seller the right to retain a
premium received in a sale of control, have in part relied on these cases
to sustain their theory that control is a "corporate asset" which may not
be sold by its holder. This "corporate asset" theory has yet to be
accepted by the courts."
Some dispute has arisen over whether a seriatim resignation of the
directors7 following a sale of control at a premium will give rise to
corporate stock in which the controlling shareholders receive more than the minority
due to misrepresentation, non-disclosure, or breach of agency. See, e.g., McCord v.
Martin, 47 Cal. App. 717, 191 Pac. 89 (192o) 5 Barber v.-Martin, 67 Neb. 445, 93
N.W. 722 (
Leech, supra at 730-74.
- e-eBERL-E & MEANS, op. cit. supra note i, at 243-44i GOWER, MODERN COMPANY
LAW 492, 524 (2d ed. 1957) ; Berle, supra note x, at 12zo-zz cf., Jennings, supra
note 2,at 39; Leech, supra note 2, at 815-17.

'For direct authority see Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 2o8, 38
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942), reversing, Levy v. Feinberg, 29 N.Y.S.2d 55o (Sup. Ct. 1941);
Benson v. Braun, 8 Misc. 2d 67, 155 N.Y.S.2d 6zz (Sup. Ct. 1956) i Tryon v. Smith,
19x Ore. 172, z29 P.zd z51 (1951) ; cf., Nelson v. Northland Life Ins. Co., 197 Minn.
151, 266 N.W. 857 (1936); Keely v. Black, 91 N.J. Eq. 52o, iii Ad. 22 (29ZO)5
Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, zx N.Y. Supp. 2z (Sup. Ct. 1932).
' See Dunnett v. Am, 71 F.zd 91z (1oth Cir. 1934) 5 Horbach v. Coyle, 2 F.zd
702 (8th Cir. 1924); Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410,
76 Atl. 77 (2920).
' No cases have held that control is a corporate asset. See Hill, supra note z at 987.
The only decision lending any credence to this theory is Moulton v. Field, 179 Fed. 673
(Tth Cir. 191o). Although the plaintiffs in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.zd 173 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), argued this theory of liability, the court
preferred to rest its decision on other grounds. See Berle, supra note z, at 1222.
' In a seriatum resignation, one director resigns at a time with his successor being
elected before the next resignation.
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liability.8 A solid line of precedent exists forbidding sale of a corporate
office when not accompanied by controlling stock.9 Some authorities
have advocated extension of this corporate office theory of liability to
all cases where directors resign incidentally to a stock sale. The proponents of this theory argue that in reality the premium was received
in exchange for a corporate office, rendering the seller liable to the
corporation for the excess consideration and any losses resulting from
looting or mismanagement by the purchasers. The courts have drawn
many technical distinctions-none of which are based on sound policyin their efforts to decide each case. For example, several decisions have
turned on the question of whether the resignations were bargained for
by the parties or were merely incidental to the sale.' 0 However, the
"corporate office" theory of liability seems to have fallen into disfavor,
and even some proponents of broad liability have rejected it.11
Most of the litigation in this area has resulted from claims that
corporate assets were wasted as a result of mismanagement or looting by
the buyers of control. These cases have involved tangible corporate
injury and the seller has often been held liable on theories of fraud or
negligence. The serious injuries in these cases have prompted the
advocacy of stringent restrictions on sales of control. Berle early suggested that a sale of controlling stock for a premium was in essence a
sale of a corporate asset.' 2 He contended that the ability to dominate
property belonging to others is a necessary ingredient of corporateness
and that, as a matter of policy, no single individual should profit from
its transfer.' 3 In the intervening years Mr. Berle has further analyzed
sales of control and refined his original theory.' 4 Although the problem
has provoked much discussion among leading commentators, comparas Compare McClure v. Law, x61
244 Pa. 427, 91 At. 428 (1914)
Div. 2o8, 38 N.Y.S.zd 517 (942)
6zz (Sup. Ct. 1956).
. See, e.g., Forbes v. McDonald,

N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899) and Porter v. Healy,
with Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App.
and Benson v. Braun, 8 Misc. 2d 67, x55 N.Y.S.zd

54 Cal. 98 (188o), Reed v. Catlett, 228 Mo. App.
og, 68 S.W.2d 734 (1934)10 See Horbach v. Coyle, 2 F.zd 702 (8th Cir. 1924) ; Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 4271
91 Atl. 428 (1914) i Hill, supra note 2, at iooo.
"1See Benson v. Braun, 8 Misc. 2d 67, x55 N.Y.S.ad 622 (Sup. Ct. 1956). Leech
specifically rejects this theory as a poor determinent of liability. Leech, supra note 2, at
807.
12 See BERLE & MEANS, op. cit. supra note i.
Id. at 244.
See also Berle, Corporate Powers in Trtst, 44 HARV. L.
1, See Berle, supra note x.
REV. 1049 (x931).
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tively few cases-have arisen and until 1955 no court had given judicial
sanction to any broad prohibitive theory.
THE PerlmanDECISION
In 1955 the controversial case of Perlman v. Feldmann15 focused
attention on the problem of sale of control. Feldmann, president and
controlling shareholder of a small steel company, sold his stock to a
corporation composed of end consumers of steel.' 6 As part of the transaction, he agreed to resign as director and president, to procure resignations of the other directors, and not to participate for a stipulated
period in any financing of steel companies. In a derivative action a
minority shareholder sought to recover the premium received by Feldmann from his sale of stock.
The District Court found no damage to the corporation and dismissed the action. 17 The decision, however, was reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one judge dissenting.18 The opinion
of the court analogized the transaction to an appropriation of a corporate
opportunity, noting that Feldmann had unfairly deprived the corporation of the benefit of "his uncorrupted business judgment."' 9 The court
held that the defendant, as controlling shareholder and director, owed
a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to the minority shareholders.
More importantly, under the court's conception of corporate injury, the
burden was on Feldmann to show that his conduct had not prevented
the corporation from exercising opportunities for gain. In remanding
the case for determination of damages, the court concluded: "When the
sale necessarily results in a sacrifice of this element of corporate good
will and consequent unusual profit to the fiduciary who has caused the
2
sacrifices, he shall account for his gains."
2 2i9 F.zd 173 (2d Cir.),

Supp. x62 (D. Conn. 1952).
L. REV. 1274. (1955)

(1956).

cert. denied, 349 U.S. 95z (1955), reversing, 129 F.
See notes in 40 CORNELL L.Q. 786 (1955) 5 68 HAPv.

zz U. Ci.

L. REV. 895 (1955);

[1956] U. ILL. L.F. 131

For the fixing of damages, see 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957), discussed

in 71 HARV. L. REv. 1559 (.958).
1" The sale .was consumated during the Korean War at a time when steel supplies
were "tight," and consumers were accordingly willing to pay high to influence the
market allocation of steel. z19 F.zd 173, 175. The court felt that the corporation

could have perhaps used the period of short supply to better advantage. Id. at 177.
x29
27 F. Supp. 162, i85-87 (D. Conn. 195z).
" Judge Swan, dissenting, contended, "[A] majority or dominant shareholder is
ordinarily privileged to sell his stock at the best price obtainable from the purchaser.
In so doing he acts on his own behalf, not as an agent of the corporation." 219 F.2d
173, 179.

"Id. at 176-77.
2Id. at 17d. The court laid down a broad definition of corporate injury5 "Only
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Because Perlman imposed on the defendant an almost impossible
burden of proof, the decision virtually prohibited retention of a premium by the seller of control. The broad scope of this decision has
provoked much disagreement among commentators. 2 1
Perlman
In three recent cases, plaintiffs with marginal claims have sought
to posit liability on Perlman. In each of these decisions the court considered and rejected the adoption of an absolute rule denying the seller
of control the right to retain the premium realized from the sale.
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE

A. Benson v. Braun
In the New York case of Benson v. Braun22 a minority shareholder
sued former controlling shareholders and directors who had sold their
stock for a premium and resigned their offices. The court ruled for the
defendants, holding that there was no evidence of bargained-for resignations and that "no damage was done to the corporation and no injury
was caused to the stockholders or creditors. 23 The opinion notes that
free transferability of controlling shares is economically desirable and
that a rule which effectively restricts transfer is unsound. 24 Rejecting
the Perlmanpolicy, the court declined to follow the narrow holding in
that case, ruling that the plaintiff had the burden of proof on the issue
of injury.
B. SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc.
SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc.,25 involved an action brought under
Section 36 of the Investment Company Act, which authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to obtain injunctions against underwriters and advisors of registered companies for "gross misconduct" or
if the defendants had been able to negate completely any possibility of gain by Newport
could they have prevailed." Id. at I77. The court further held that Feldmann had
the burden of separating the consideration received for control from the value of the
stock.

Id. at 178.

See Berle, supra note

i, at 2z2.
Compare Hill, supra note 2, at 986, 1038-39
'aith Leech, supra note 2, at 815-17.
22 8 Misc. 2d 67, x55 N.Y.S.zd 622 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
For the previous history of
this case see 141 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, z86 App. Div. 1098, 145 N.Y.S.2d
711 (1955).
In these earlier phases the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied,
primarily due to an allegation in the complaint that the buyers of control had previously
looted the corporation. This allegation was not substantiated at the ensuing trial.
23 8 Misc. 2d 67, 73, 155 N.Y.S.zd 6zz, 6z9 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
"'Id.at 69, 155 N.Y.S.zd at 626.
"5 254 F.2d 642 ( 9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (x958),
affirming, 146 F.
Supp. 778 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
21
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"gross abuse of trust."2 6

The defendant, investment adviser and prin-

cipal underwriter for a registered investment trust fund that had no
officers of its own, transfered his controlling stock for a premium of
several million dollars. The SEC, alleging that the seller received the
premium for a sale of his position as advisor, sought to enjoin the purchasing group from acting as advisor and to compel an accounting of the
premium and investment fees.
The District Court dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. After distinguishing Perlman," the court
held that nothing in general equity principles indicated that the seller's
conduct amounted to "gross misconduct" or "gross abuse of trust."2 8
Thus, the court rejected an attempt by the SEC to interpolate the
prohibitive Perlman rule into the Investment Company Act. Although
the court did not speculate as to the propriety of Perlman, it intimated
that insofar as SEC jurisdiction is concerned any change in the law
governing sales of control must be made by Congress.29
C. Manacher v. Reynolds
The most recent judicial rejection of Perlman is found in a I96O
Delaware decision, Manacher v. Reynolds.3 0 United States Foil was a
holding company owning the controlling stock in Reynolds Metals
Company. Foil's own stock was divided into voting ("A") stock held
by the Reynolds family and widely-held, nonvoting ("B") stock. The
"B" stock sold on the market at a one-third discount from what its
equity in Reynolds Metals warranted. The original plaintiff had
sought a dissolution of Foil and a distribution of its stock in Metals.
In a proposed settlement, a reclassification of stock into a single class
with equal rights was agreed upon. Each share of "A" was to be ex2"

"The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district court of

the United States . . . alleging that a person serving or acting in one or more of the
following capacities has been guilty . . . of gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust in
respect of any registered investment company for which such person so serves or acts:
as officer, director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser, or de(i)
positori or

(z)

as principal underwriter ....

If the Commission's allegations of such gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust are
established, the court shall enjoin such persons from acting in such capacity or capacities
either permanently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall deem appropriate." 54.Stat. 84.1 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-35 (.958).
27 254 F.zd 64z, 650 (gth Cir. 1958).
2" Id. at 65 1.
29 Ibid.

o 165 A.zd 741 (Del. Ch. 296o).

DUKE LA
1 W JOURN4L

[Vol. ig6i: 534

changed for three shares of new stock and each share of "B" for one
share of new stock. Foil would then be dissolved. The settlement and
dissolution were ratified by both "A" and "B" shareholders, and the
market value of "B" rapidly increased, almost eliminating the discount.
Dissenting "B" shareholders intervened, however, contending that
the settlement was unfair because it gave the "A" group a premium for
giving up absolute control. Their objection was based on Berle's corporate asset theory and the fiduciary principle of Perlman. The chancellor rejected these arguments, pointing out that the "B" group had
obtained the obliteration of the discount which could only have been
accomplished by the "All group's surrender of absolute control. After
distinguishing Perlman, he added: s '
If this distinction lacks substance, I can only express a preference for the ...
view that the increment in stock value belongs to the sellers, absent some
breach of duty. I say this because I am satisfied that a practical decision of
this issue had been in existence in the business community for too many years
for a court to upset it. Moreover, the implications inherent in the adoption of
the rule espoused by Mr. Berle would create more doubts than it would
resolve.
Although Perlman was easily distinguishable on its facts, the court's
approach suggests a basic policy difference. The chancellor, employing
a business reality test, permitted the receipt of a premium for surrender
of absolute control and approved the settlement as fair to all shareholders.
As evidenced by the latest judicial pronouncements, Perlman has
not settled this confused area of the law. These decisions point to a
shift in emphasis toward a more pragmatic approach.
ANALYSIS AND REAPPRAISAL

The frequent abuses that have accompanied sale of control have
prompted the advocation of a broad rule of accountability for any premium realized on such a sale. It is suggested, however, that this problem should be approached more analytically, on a case by case basis.
Under such an approach, the court would first determine if the seller's
negligence or bad faith conduct resulted in injury to the corporation.
If so, liability should be squarely based on the wrongfulness of the
conduct. If the seller was not culpable, the court would determine if
the circumstances surrounding the sale should cause the seller of control
"Id. at

751.
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to be held strictly liable for the premium realized on the sale. The
shareholders' reasonable economic expectations should be the court's
primary guide in each decision. The court should scrutinize the control
pattern of the particular corporation involved and attempt to ascertain
the reasonable expectations of the shareholders toward participation in
control. These expectations will vary according to the corporation's
control pattern.
A. Control Patterns and Expectations as a Test of Strict Liability
for Sale of Control
i. The Public-Issue Corporation
Stock in public-issue corporations generally is widely held; as a result,
no single stockholder is able to obtain control through his holdings.
Control is frequently maintained by professional management, which
usually perpetuates itself in office.3 2 Stockholders in these corporations
normally purchase their shares solely for investment and not in anticipation of participating in management. Their only expectation is that
their investment will be protected and yield a fair return. 3 3 Because
stock transactions and management changes have little or no interdependency, cases involving sales of controlling stock have not arisen.
2. The Close Corporation

The control pattern of a close corporation differs markedly from that
of its public-issue counterpart and in many respects deviates from the
statutory norm of director control. Frequently, all shareholders expect
to participate in the management of the close corporation as if the
enterprise were a' partnership.3" This control pattern may be set by'
" See,

e.g.,

BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

84-90,
24 (1932)
Hornstein,
PA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (19143).

Corporate Control and Private Property Rules, 92 U.

The individuals comprising management change through the use of pension plans
and other retirement devices. Thus management is able to perpetuate control and still
have directors and officers with an interest in the business. These "turnover mechanisms" serve an economic function similar to that of the premium in "mixed" corpora-

tions.

op. cit. supra note 32, at 63-68.
"[Slhareholders in a close corporation are usually vitally interested in maintain-

22 BERLE & MEANS,
2

ing their proportionate interest in dividends and assets .... Control ismore important
to a shareholder in a closley held corporation than to one in a publicly held corporation
because control in a closely held corporation often means employment, and the loss of
control may result in a termination of employment." i O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE 120-21 (1958). See i HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 172 (19s9) 5 Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 435, 439-41 (953).
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special charter and by-law provisions or developed through other agreements and business practices. 35 In a sense control belongs to all, and an
unrestricted, unilateral power to dispose of it may upset the delicate
basis upon which the quasi-partners have established their business.
When a sale occurs the remaining shareholders are extremely susceptible to injury through squeeze-outs and other corporate manipulations.36 Difficulties stemming from the sale of control in a close corporation may usually be prevented through careful drafting of charter and
by-law provisions and shareholder agreements. Provisions allowing the
corporation or the remaining shareholders a first option on the purchase
of shares and buy and sell arrangements among shareholders are often
effectively utilized to prevent sales to outsiders." However, incomplete drafting or local policy against such restraints on sale may give a
controlling shareholder an unrestricted power to sell to outsiders, to the
detriment of the business expectations of the remaining participants. 8
Where there has been a sale of control in a close corporation, a court
should carefully analyze the business arrangement and determine the
reasonable expectations of the parties. If the business practices of the
" See generally, i HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ t7i-85
(1959) i i O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 5.01-5.39 (1958);
O'Neal, Giving ShareholdersPower to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of Special Charter
and By-law Provisions, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 451 (1953) 5 Steadman, Maintaining Control of Close Corporations,14 Bus. LAW. 1077 (1959).
"' See 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 8.07-8.09 (1958).
A typical situation is that involved in the Inland Steel litigation. See Lebold v. Inland
S.S. Co., 8z F.2d 351 ( 7 th Cir. 1936) and Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 1z5 F.zd 369
'( 7 th Cir. 1942). For an excellent treatment of squeeze-outs, see generally, O'NEAL &
DERWIN,

EXPULSION

SMALL ENTERPRISES

OR

OPPRESSION

OF BUSINESS

ASSOCIATES:

"SQUEEZE-OUTS"

IN

(1961).

"' See Hornstein, Judical Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 435, 445-48 (1953).
See generally, Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation,37 VA. L. REV. 229 (1951); O'Neal, Restrictions
osz Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:Planing and Drafting, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 773 (952).
38 See O'Neal, supra note 37, at 774. A case instructively illustrating such frustration is United Trust Ltd. v. South African Milling Co., [1959] 2 So. Afr. L.R. 426.
There, plaintiff milling company organized a bakery as a consumer of its product.
Plaintiff later sold some stock to one of the bakery's managers, and they jointly over a
period of years sold stock to officers of the company. Although a complex control pattern was expressly provided for by shareholder agreements, the restrictions on alienation
of the shares were subject to suspension by a vote of the majority of the shares. A
group of the shareholders, obtaining fifty-one per cent of the stock, sold out as a block
to defendant milling company who was the plaintiff's major competitor. The plaintiff's action for injunction and recission was unsuccessful. Careful drafting would have
avoided this result. The case was criticized in 76 S.A.LJ. 259 (1959).
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corporation in question indicate that the participating shareholders intended that control was to be shared through management participation,
one shareholder should not be permitted to profit from his unilateral
disruption of the arrangement. As one authority who has extensively
studied the field of close corporations points out:8"
Where several owners carry on an enterprise together. .

.

. their relation

should be a fiduciary one similar to the relationship among partners. The
fact that the enterprise is incorporated should not substantially change the pic[W]hen businessmen organize a corporation they enter into their
ture ....
relationship against a background of corporate statutes and common law
doctrine which vests in the directors the power to manage the corporation's
affairs.... That should not mean, however, that the directors or the majority
shareholders should be permitted to exercise their powers arbitrarily or without
regard to the legitimate expectations of the minority shareholders.
When the court has determined that a sale violates the reasonable

expectations of the remaining shareholders, the problem of a proper
remedy must be considered. Absent express restriction on sale, a shareholder normally has the right to dispose of his stock. Thus, prospective
relief by injunction is normally limited to cases involving violations of
4 ° Howshareholder agreements or forseeable injury to the corporation.
ever, recovery of the premium should be permitted since the proceeds
of a sale of control, in reality, belong to all the participants when the sale
is contrary to their reasonable expectations. 41 Although the judicial
remedy of recovery of the premium is helpful relief, the best solution
so z O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 36, at 107-08.

Cf., Mr. Justice Brandeis in Southern

Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 25o U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919). "The majority has the right to
control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority .. ."
"oSee Nelson v. Northland Life Ins. Co., 197 Minn. 151, z66 N.W. 857 (936)
(recission denied)5 Ingraham v. National Salt Co., 36 Misc. 646, 74 N.Y. Supp. 388
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 72 App. Div. 582, 76 N.Y. Supp. iot6 (19o2), aff'd per
(19o4); Phelan v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co.,
cuaram, 179 N.Y. 556, 71 N.E. 1i31
cf., HORNSTEIN, op. cit. supra note
24 Misc. 09, 53 N.Y. Supp. 305 (Sup. Ct. 1898)
35, at § 186; O'NEAL, op. -cit. supra note 36, at § 7.145 Steadman, supra note 35, at
1090.
'" See Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 107, 179 N.E. 310 (1932).
Occasionally the "law of self-help" may be effectively used. In one case, A and B
held the majority of stock in a close corporation, but were a minority on a five-man
board of directors. They contracted to sell their shares to an outsider at a high price.
CG,
D and E, the remaining shareholder-directors, voted to issue enough shares to E to
eradicate the .4-B majority. E testified that this was done to perpetuate the company
on the same basis as it had been set up. The court, in permitting the issue of stock,
held that this was not fraud but was for a corporate purpose. Standard International
Corp. v. McDonald Printing Co., 159 N.E.2d 82z (Ohio C.P. 1959).
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to the problem is through a perceptive use of preventive drafting designed to effectuate shareholder expectations.
3. The "Mixed" Corporation
Many corporations combine features of both the public-issue and the
dose corporation in their control pattern; one or a small group of shareholders has stock control, and the remainder of the outstanding shares
are widely-held. Buy-out provisions are impractical since the widelyheld stock should remain unfettered by restraints on sale. In these
businesses, conveniently denominated "mixed" corporations, the problem of sale of control at a premium most frequently arises.
It is evident from an examination of the control pattern of a "mixed"
corporation that the economic expectations of individual shareholders
will vary. 42 The widely-held stock, as in the public-issue corporation,
is purchased primarily, if not solely, for investment and its owners may
accurately be termed investment shareholders. On the other hand, the
controlling shareholder in a "mixed" corporation holds his stock primarily to effectuate control and to manage the business. He realistically
expects to receive a premium upon sale of the controlling stock based
on the recognized separate worth of the control element as an increment
to the investment value of the stock.4 3 Often the controlling shareholder has purchased control at a premium or amassed it through the
market and buyers are willing to pay for this aggregate value as an
asset. Clearly, it is reasonable for the controlling shareholder to expect
to manage the business and to receive value for the control upon sale
of his stock. 44 Absent actual abuse, positive considerations support a
realization of the shareholder's expectations.
When several shareholders participate in management of a "mixed"
corporation, a situation similar to that of the close corporation is presented. The court should investigate the particular control pattern and
"See

BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS, 331 (3rd ed. 1958).

Illustrative

of "mixed" corporations are Ford Motor Company and Reynolds Metals. See also,
Perlman v. Feldmann 129 F. Supp. 167, 184 (D. Conn. 1952) Barnes v. Brown, 8o
N.Y. 527 (18go) ; Katz, The Sale of Corporate Control, 38 CHI. BAR REC. 376, 380

(-957).

"See Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 633, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221, 233 (Sup. Ct.
1931), where the court said, "No one will argue that the holder of a large block of the
stock of a corporation would be under a duty to account for his profit to the corporation. As such holder he might be in a position to command a considerable premium
above current prices in a favorable market. The advantage would be entirely his .. .
See Tryon v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 1So, 229 P.2d 251, 254 (951).
"See Short v. Treasury Comm'rs, [1948] A.C. 534, 546; Hornstein, Corporate
Control and Private Property Rules, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1943).
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the expectations of the participating shareholders in determining whether
a unilateral disruption of the corporate organization should subject the
seller to liability. Controlling shareholders of a "mixed" corporation
are also quasi-partners and should be subject to a mutual fiduciary duty
on control dispositions." However, this principle should not extend to
the relationship between controlling and investment shareholders, who
have no such identiy of interests.4 6 Since an investment shareholder
does not expect to participate in management when he purchases his
stock, his expectations are not prejudiced by a transfer of control, and
he should not share in the premium.
Another positive reason for permitting the seller of controlling
stock in a "mixed" corporation to retain his premium is the useful economic function the premium serves. If the shareholder desires to leave
the business, the receipt of a premium will facilitate his exit, and control
may thus pass from a party who has lost interest in active management
to one who has such an interest. 47 The change should be complete,
including stock and directors; there should be no liability posited on the
theory of sale of a corporate office.48
"As in the close corporation, the utility of various restrictions on alienation of
shares among such control groups should not be overlooked.
"' See Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REv. 986, 1013-20 (1957) 5
Katz, supra note 42, at 3803 cf., Keely v. Black, 91 N.J. Eq. 52o, 11 Ad. 22 (1920) ;
Tryon v. Smith, zx Ore. 172, 229 P.2d 251 (1954).
"7See Nelson v. Northland Life Ins. Co., 197 Minn. 15 , z66 N.W. 857 (936) ;
Hill, supra note 46, at 1017-185 Katz, supra note 42, at 379i Comment, 19 U. CHI. L.
REV. 869, 871 (952) ; cf., Beitman v. Steiner, 98 Ala. 241, 13 So. 87 (5893).
Some writers have intimated that the seller of control should insist as a condition to
the sale that a prospective buyer offer to purchase all the outstanding shares at the same
price. This requirement is said to protect the investment shareholders and to correlate
with Perlman. Jennings, Trading inz Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 39
(1956). As a device for protecting investment shareholders such a requirement defeats
its own purpose. Often there will be no sale if a general offer is required, and the
controlling shareholder may thus be forced to sell on the market or remain locked in
the business. Any large volume of stock on the market may bring the exchange value
down, impairing the investment value of the stock and injurying the investment shareholders. In effect, a scheme serving a useful function in many close corporations may
seriously injure shareholders in a cmixed" corporation. Cf., Katz, supra note 42, at
379-80.
"8This policy determination was cogently pointed out in one of the more recent
cases. "The purpose of the rules restricting transfers of controlling interests is to
prevent transactions tainted with bad faith, intent to defraud or negligence on the part
of those possessing control. In the absence of such elements it is desirable that control
of a corporation be readily transferable so that persons with ideas for improving a
business might be able to put their ability to work. [citation omitted] When ownership of controlling stock changes hands, a change in the board of directors is generally
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The premium promotes changes in control, reducing the likelihood
of stagnation in the business; at the same time no one buying or holding
control will fear being locked in a business due to stifling restraints on
the transfer of stock. A rule of law resulting in a virtual prohibition
of sale at a premium has the practical effect of restricting the free'transferability of controlling stock contrary to sound economic policy.
A prohibition on sale of control at a premium fails to accord with
the expectations of the shareholders in a "mixed" corporation. Control
has value to its holder who anticipates receiving consideration for its
sale; investment shareholders expect their investment to be protected
and not to participate in control. However, transfers of control are
susceptible of abuse. While these abuses have led some writers to
advocate an absolute prohibition of the retention of a premium for
control, the decided cases indicate that other adequate remedies for
these abuses are available.
B. Remedies for Corporate Injury Resulting from
Control Transfers
The courts have utilized several traditional theories to provide
remedies for serious injuries to a corporation resulting from a transfer
of controlling stock. The most common of these injuries is a wasting
of corporate assets by the new holder of control through actual looting
or management ineptness. The law governing the wasting of corporate
assets is comparatively settled; the shareholder who sells control is held
to a duty of due care and diligence.4 9 If the sale results in injury to
the corporation he may be liable for negligence."
expected."

Benson v. Braun, 8 Misc. zd 67, 69, 155 N.Y.S.zd 622, 6z5 (Sup. Ct.
See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & No. R.R., x5O N.Y. 410, 425,
44 N.E. 1043, 1046 (1896); Barnes v. Brown, 8o N.Y. 527 (iS8o).
" See Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1940); Field v. Western Life Indem. Co., i66 Fed. 607 (N.D. Ill. 19o8), aff'd sub
noma., Moulton v. Field, 179 Fed. 673 ( 7 th Cir. 19o); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28
N.Y.S.zd 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
2956).

"0When the court is inclined to allow recovery from the seller, additional problems
arise in determining the amount and the recipient of the award. A recovery by the
corporation, unless it is in receivership, will effectively return to the buyers their payment. Most courts have awarded pro rata recovery to the minority shareholders. See
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.zd 173 (zd Cir. x955); Dunnett v. Arn, 71 F.zd 912
(oth Cir. 1934)5 Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428 (1914). Several cases
have permitted a receiver of the corporation to recover. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y.
78, 55 N.E. 388 (1889)5 Ballentine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.zd 668 (Supt. Ct. 1941)
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 62z (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Dale v. Thomas H. Temple
Co.,

86 Tenn. 69,

208

S.W.2d 344 (1948).

Berle favors recovery by the corporations
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When certain "special facts" 1 are present the seller is deemed to
be on notice and is required to make a diligent inquiry into the background of the buyers. Although the courts have not formulated a
general rule setting out what "special facts" precipitate notice, the decided cases give some indication of important factors to be considered.
In several cases involving predominately liquid corporate assets, such
as securities, the courts have imposed a duty to investigate. 2 In accord
with business reality, these courts have indicated that one is negligent
if, without inquiry, he places easily convertible assets in the hands of a
stranger. In addition, the offer of a large premium alone may call for
53
investigation.
The seller should carefully examine the background of the buyer
if under all the circumstances such an investigation would be prudent to
protect the minority's investment." A succint statement of the rule is
found in the leading case of Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal
Corp.:"
[T]he owners of control are under a duty not to transfer it to outsiders if

the circumstances surrounding the proposed transfer are such as to awaken
suspicion and put a prudent man on his guard.... If, after... investigation,
the sellers are deceived by false representations, there might not be liability,
but if the circumstances put the seller on notice and if no adequate investigation is made and harm follows, then liability also follows.
under any circumstances.

See Berle, Control in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV.

I212, 1220 (1958).

In awarding damages, the courts, with little consistency, have sometimes measured
recovery by the extent of the injury to the corporationi sometimes by the premium5 and
sometimes by both. See e.g., Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., supra note
49 (loss to the corporation) ; Ballentine v. Ferretti, supra (premium only) 5 Gerdes v.
Reynolds, supra (both); Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., supra (most of loss to
corporation).

" The "special facts" doctrine developed in connection with the analogous problem
where the corporate insider buys stock from a minority shareholder without full disclosure of inside information bearing on the value. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419
(i909).

See analysis in Stickells, Stockholders' Duty in Sale of Stock, 31 B.U.L. REV.

191 (951).
" See Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1940) 5 Ballentine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1941) j Gerdes v. Reynolds,
28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).

"See Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., supra note 51; Gerdes v.
Reynolds, supra note 52.
'See Benson v. Braun, 141 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (see note 22 supra).
Also, if the prospective buyers have a reputation for looting or mismanagement in the
business community, the seller will be liable. See Field v. Western Life Indem. Co.,
19o8).
166 Fed. 607 (N.D. Ill.
as 35 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
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Occasionally a court will hold the seller liable for fraud in the sale.
For example, where the contract of sale called for deferred payment of
the purchase price and it appeared that payment would come out of the
corporate assets, the seller was held liable for the loss.5 6 Also, when
the seller refused an offer for the sale of a particular corporate asset
and later sold controlling stock to the same buyer at the same price, one
court, looking to the substance of the transaction, permitted recovery for
fraud in selling a corporate asset for personal benefit.5"
Although the theory of liability upon which a court reaches its
result is often difficult to ascertain,58 the fraud and negligence grounds
are well established. These remedies provide adequate relief for serious
abusesi" yet, a prudent seller of control, acting in good faith, is free
to realize his reasonable expectations.
CONCLUSION

Transfers of corporate control for a premium present the courts with
many intricate problems which should be settled through a pragmatic
approach. A court, by carefully examining the control pattern of the
corporation, should ascertain the reasonable expectations of the shareholders. In conjunction with traditional remedies of fraud and negligence, the fiduciary concept should be utilized in the appropriate case
to protect these shareholder expectations. However, any further imposition of liability is unwarranted and contrary to business reality and
sound economic policy.
"oDale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., z86 Tenn. 69, 2o8 S.W.2d 344 (1948); cf.,
Upton v. Southern Produce Co., 147 Va. 937, 133 S.E. 576 (1926).
" Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 At. 77 (1910);
cf., Dunnett v. Am, 71 F.zd 912 (ioth Cir. 1934); Horbach v. Coyle, 2 F.2d 702
(8th Cir. 1924).
"8See Oil Shares, Inc. v. Kahn, 94 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1938); Moulton v. Field,
179 Fed. 673 (7 th Cir. 1go ) ; Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.zd 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
See also Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.zd 389 (6th Cir. 1954).
6"See Hill, suprz note 46, at 1039.

